While both can legislate, member states can only legislate to the extent to which the EU has not. In other policy areas the EU can only co-ordinate, support and supplement member state action but cannot enact legislation with the aim of harmonising national laws. That a particular policy area falls into a certain category of competence is not necessarily indicative of what legislative procedure is used for enacting legislation within that policy area.
Different legislative procedures are used within the same category of competence, and even with the same policy area. The distribution of competences in various policy areas between Member States and the Union is divided in the following three categories:. The EU is based on a series of treaties. These first established the European Community and the EU, and then made amendments to those founding treaties. These legal powers include the ability to enact legislation [q] which can directly affect all member states and their inhabitants.
Under the principle of supremacy , national courts are required to enforce the treaties that their member states have ratified, and thus the laws enacted under them, even if doing so requires them to ignore conflicting national law, and within limits even constitutional provisions.
The direct effect and supremacy doctrines were not explicitly set out the European Treaties but were developed by the Court of Justice itself over the s, apparently under the influence of its then most influential judge, Frenchman Robert Lecourt . The judicial branch of the EU—formally called the Court of Justice of the European Union —consists of two courts: the Court of Justice and the General Court  The Court of Justice primarily deals with cases taken by member states, the institutions, and cases referred to it by the courts of member states.
The General Court mainly deals with cases taken by individuals and companies directly before the EU's courts,  and the European Union Civil Service Tribunal adjudicates in disputes between the European Union and its civil service. The treaties declare that the EU itself is "founded on the values of respect for human dignity , freedom , democracy, equality , the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities The charter is a codified catalogue of fundamental rights against which the EU's legal acts can be judged.
It consolidates many rights which were previously recognised by the Court of Justice and derived from the "constitutional traditions common to the member states. Although, the EU is independent from Council of Europe, they share purpose and ideas especially on rule of law, human rights and democracy. The EU also promoted human rights issues in the wider world. The EU opposes the death penalty and has proposed its worldwide abolition.
Abolition of the death penalty is a condition for EU membership. The main legal acts of the EU come in three forms: regulations , directives , and decisions. Regulations become law in all member states the moment they come into force, without the requirement for any implementing measures, [w] and automatically override conflicting domestic provisions. The details of how they are to be implemented are left to member states.
Decisions offer an alternative to the two above modes of legislation. They are legal acts which only apply to specified individuals, companies or a particular member state. They are most often used in competition law , or on rulings on State Aid, but are also frequently used for procedural or administrative matters within the institutions. Regulations, directives, and decisions are of equal legal value and apply without any formal hierarchy.
The borders inside the Schengen Area between Germany and Austria. Europol Headquarters in The Hague , Netherlands. Seat of Frontex in Warsaw , Poland. Since the creation of the EU in , it has developed its competencies in the area of justice and home affairs; initially at an intergovernmental level and later by supranationalism.
Accordingly, the Union has legislated in areas such as extradition ,  family law,  asylum law,  and criminal justice. The Union has also established agencies to co-ordinate police, prosecutorial and immigrations controls across the member states: Europol for co-operation of police forces,  Eurojust for co-operation between prosecutors,  and Frontex for co-operation between border control authorities.
This co-operation had to particularly be developed with the advent of open borders through the Schengen Agreement and the associated cross border crime. Foreign policy co-operation between member states dates from the establishment of the Community in , when member states negotiated as a bloc in international trade negotiations under the EU's common commercial policy. It was not, however, until when European Political Cooperation was introduced on a formal basis by the Single European Act.
The aims of the CFSP are to promote both the EU's own interests and those of the international community as a whole, including the furtherance of international co-operation, respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The unanimity and difficult issues treated under the CFSP sometimes lead to disagreements, such as those which occurred over the war in Iraq. The coordinator and representative of the CFSP within the EU is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who speaks on behalf of the EU in foreign policy and defence matters, and has the task of articulating the positions expressed by the member states on these fields of policy into a common alignment.
The High Representative heads up the European External Action Service EEAS , a unique EU department  that has been officially implemented and operational since 1 December on the occasion of the first anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Federica Mogherini, next to M. The EU participates in all G8 and G20 summits.
G20 summit in Hangzhou, Besides the emerging international policy of the European Union, the international influence of the EU is also felt through enlargement. The perceived benefits of becoming a member of the EU act as an incentive for both political and economic reform in states wishing to fulfil the EU's accession criteria, and are considered an important factor contributing to the reform of European formerly Communist countries. The European Union has concluded free trade agreements FTAs  and other agreements with a trade component with many countries worldwide and is negotiating with many others.
The predecessors of the European Union were not devised as a military alliance because NATO was largely seen as appropriate and sufficient for defence purposes. Following the Kosovo War in , the European Council agreed that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO".
To that end, a number of efforts were made to increase the EU's military capability, notably the Helsinki Headline Goal process. EU forces have been deployed on peacekeeping missions from middle and northern Africa to the western Balkans and western Asia. It aims to detect and stop illegal immigration, human trafficking and terrorist infiltration. In the European Commission presented its proposal for a new European Border and Coast Guard Agency having a stronger role and mandate along with national authorities for border management.
In an EU consisting of 28 members, substantial security and defence co-operation is increasingly relying on collaboration among all member states. In , the average among EU countries was 0. Because of its ability to shape rules and norms on a global level as well as its attempts to influence neighbouring countries, the EU has been called an emerging or potential superpower by scholars and academics like T. The EU uses foreign relations instruments like the European Neighbourhood Policy which seeks to tie those countries to the east and south of the European territory of the EU to the Union.
These countries, primarily developing countries, include some who seek to one day become either a member state of the European Union , or more closely integrated with the European Union. The EU offers financial assistance to countries within the European Neighbourhood, so long as they meet the strict conditions of government reform, economic reform and other issues surrounding positive transformation.
This process is normally underpinned by an Action Plan, as agreed by both Brussels and the target country. Critics of the concept of the EU as an emerging superpower point to the lack of either a strong European military or of unified EU foreign policy. The European Union has established a single market across the territory of all its members representing million citizens.
The currency union represents million EU citizens. Of the top largest corporations in the world measured by revenue in , have their headquarters in the EU. Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds are supporting the development of underdeveloped regions of the EU. Such regions are primarily located in the states of central and southern Europe. EU research and technological framework programmes sponsor research conducted by consortia from all EU members to work towards a single European Research Area.
Two of the original core objectives of the European Economic Community were the development of a common market, subsequently becoming a single market , and a customs union between its member states. The single market involves the free circulation of goods, capital, people, and services within the EU ,  and the customs union involves the application of a common external tariff on all goods entering the market. Once goods have been admitted into the market they cannot be subjected to customs duties, discriminatory taxes or import quotas , as they travel internally.
The non-EU member states of Iceland , Norway , Liechtenstein and Switzerland participate in the single market but not in the customs union. Free movement of capital is intended to permit movement of investments such as property purchases and buying of shares between countries. Post-Maastricht there has been a rapidly developing corpus of ECJ judgements regarding this initially neglected freedom.
The free movement of capital is unique insofar as it is granted equally to non-member states. The free movement of persons means that EU citizens can move freely between member states to live, work, study or retire in another country. This required the lowering of administrative formalities and recognition of professional qualifications of other states. The free movement of services and of establishment allows self-employed persons to move between member states to provide services on a temporary or permanent basis. This lacuna has been addressed by the recently passed Directive on services in the internal market which aims to liberalise the cross border provision of services.
The creation of a European single currency became an official objective of the European Economic Community in In , having negotiated the structure and procedures of a currency union, the member states signed the Maastricht Treaty and were legally bound to fulfil the agreed-on rules including the convergence criteria if they wanted to join the monetary union.
The states wanting to participate had first to join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. In the currency union started, first as an accounting currency with eleven member states joining. In , the currency was fully put into place, when euro notes and coins were issued and national currencies began to phase out in the eurozone, which by then consisted of 12 member states. The eurozone constituted by the EU member states which have adopted the euro has since grown to 19 countries.
The aim of this financial control system is to ensure the economic stability of the EU. To prevent the joining states from getting into financial trouble or crisis after entering the monetary union, they were obliged in the Maastricht treaty to fulfil important financial obligations and procedures, especially to show budgetary discipline and a high degree of sustainable economic convergence, as well as to avoid excessive government deficits and limit the government debt to a sustainable level.
The EU has had legislative power in the area of energy policy for most of its existence; this has its roots in the original European Coal and Steel Community. The introduction of a mandatory and comprehensive European energy policy was approved at the meeting of the European Council in October , and the first draft policy was published in January The EU has five key points in its energy policy: increase competition in the internal market , encourage investment and boost interconnections between electricity grids; diversify energy resources with better systems to respond to a crisis; establish a new treaty framework for energy co-operation with Russia while improving relations with energy-rich states in Central Asia  and North Africa; use existing energy supplies more efficiently while increasing renewable energy commercialisation ; and finally increase funding for new energy technologies.
There is a strong dependence on Russian energy that the EU has been attempting to reduce. Rail transport in Europe is being synchronised with the European Rail Traffic Management System ERTMS , an initiative to greatly enhance safety, increase efficiency of trains and enhance cross-border interoperability of rail transport in Europe by replacing signalling equipment with digitised mostly wireless versions and by creating a single Europe-wide standard for train control and command systems.
The developing European transport policies will increase the pressure on the environment in many regions by the increased transport network. In the pre EU members, the major problem in transport deals with congestion and pollution. After the recent enlargement, the new states that joined since added the problem of solving accessibility to the transport agenda.
The Galileo positioning system is another EU infrastructure project. The Galileo project was launched partly to reduce the EU's dependency on the US-operated Global Positioning System , but also to give more complete global coverage and allow for greater accuracy, given the aged nature of the GPS system. The port of Tallinn is one of the busiest cruise and passenger harbours in Northern Europe with over 10 million people passing through in Spain places second in High-speed rail constructed km in the world after China.
The policy's price controls and market interventions led to considerable overproduction. These were intervention stores of products bought up by the Community to maintain minimum price levels. To dispose of surplus stores, they were often sold on the world market at prices considerably below Community guaranteed prices, or farmers were offered subsidies amounting to the difference between the Community and world prices to export their products outside the Community.
This system has been criticised for under-cutting farmers outside Europe, especially those in the developing world. Since the beginning of the s, the CAP has been subject to a series of reforms. Initially, these reforms included the introduction of set-aside in , where a proportion of farm land was deliberately withdrawn from production, milk quotas and, more recently, the 'de-coupling' or disassociation of the money farmers receive from the EU and the amount they produce by the Fischler reforms in Agriculture expenditure will move away from subsidy payments linked to specific produce, toward direct payments based on farm size.
This is intended to allow the market to dictate production levels. The EU operates a competition policy intended to ensure undistorted competition within the single market. The Competition Commissioner , currently Margrethe Vestager , is one of the most powerful positions in the Commission, notable for the ability to affect the commercial interests of trans-national corporations. The EU has long sought to mitigate the effects of free markets by protecting workers rights and preventing social and environmental dumping. To this end it has adopted laws establishing minimum employment and environmental standards.
The EU has also sought to coordinate the social security and health systems of member states to facilitate individuals exercising free movement rights and to ensure they maintain their ability to access social security and health services in other member states. In , when the EEC was founded, it had no environmental policy. European policy-makers originally increased the EU's capacity to act on environmental issues by defining it as a trade problem. The legal basis for EU environmental policy was established with the introduction of the Single European Act in Initially, EU environmental policy focused on Europe.
More recently, the EU has demonstrated leadership in global environmental governance, e. This international dimension is reflected in the EU's Sixth Environmental Action Programme,  which recognises that its objectives can only be achieved if key international agreements are actively supported and properly implemented both at EU level and worldwide. The Lisbon Treaty further strengthened the leadership ambitions. Mitigating climate change is one of the top priorities of EU environmental policy.
In the Elections to the European Parliament in , the green parties increased their power, possibly because of the rise of post materialist values. Proposals to reach a zero carbon economy in the European Union by were suggested in - Almost all member states supported that goal at an EU summit in June Basic education is an area where the EU's role is limited to supporting national governments. In higher education, the policy was developed in the s in programmes supporting exchanges and mobility. The most visible of these has been the Erasmus Programme , a university exchange programme which began in There are similar programmes for school pupils and teachers, for trainees in vocational education and training , and for adult learners in the Lifelong Learning Programme — These programmes are designed to encourage a wider knowledge of other countries and to spread good practices in the education and training fields across the EU.
Scientific development is facilitated through the EU's Framework Programmes , the first of which started in The aims of EU policy in this area are to co-ordinate and stimulate research. Although the EU has no major competences in the field of health care, Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union affirms that "A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities".
The European Commission 's Directorate-General for Health and Consumers seeks to align national laws on the protection of people's health, on the consumers' rights, on the safety of food and other products. All EU and many other European countries offer their citizens a free European Health Insurance Card which, on a reciprocal basis, provides insurance for emergency medical treatment insurance when visiting other participating European countries.
Cultural co-operation between member states has been a concern of the EU since its inclusion as a community competency in the Maastricht Treaty. Association football is by far the most popular sport in the European Union by the number of registered players. The other sports with the most participants in clubs are tennis, basketball, swimming, athletics, golf, gymnastics, equestrian sports, handball, volleyball and sailing.
Sport is mainly the responsibility of the member states or other international organisations, rather than of the EU. However, there are some EU policies that have affected sport, such as the free movement of workers, which was at the core of the Bosman ruling that prohibited national football leagues from imposing quotas on foreign players with European citizenship. The Treaty of Lisbon requires any application of economic rules to take into account the specific nature of sport and its structures based on voluntary activity. The flag used is the Flag of Europe , which consists of a circle of 12 golden stars on a blue background.
Originally designed in for the Council of Europe, the flag was adopted by the European Communities , the predecessors of the present Union, in The Council of Europe gave the flag a symbolic description in the following terms,  though the official symbolic description adopted by the EU omits the reference to the "Western world": . Against the blue sky of the Western world, the stars symbolise the peoples of Europe in a form of a circle, the sign of union.
The number of stars is invariably twelve , the figure twelve being the symbol of perfection and entirety. United in Diversity was adopted as the motto of the Union in the year , having been selected from proposals submitted by school pupils. The anthem of the Union is an instrumental version of the prelude to the Ode to Joy , the 4th movement of Ludwig van Beethoven 's ninth symphony.
The anthem was adopted by European Community leaders in and has since been played on official occasions. Known from the myth in which Zeus seduces her in the guise of a white bull, Europa has also been referred to in relation to the present Union. Statues of Europa and the bull decorate several of the Union's institutions and a portrait of her is seen on the series of Euro banknotes. The bull is, for its part, depicted on all residence permit cards. The Commission has named one of its central buildings in Brussels after Charlemagne and the city of Aachen has since awarded the Charlemagne Prize to champions of European unification.
Media freedom is a fundamental right that applies to all member states of the European Union and its citizens , as defined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as the European Convention on Human Rights. The vast majority of media in the European Union are national-oriented. It provides support for the development, promotion and distribution of European works within Europe and beyond. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. For other uses, see EU disambiguation. Economic and political union of European states. European Union.
Location of the European Union, its outermost regions , and the overseas countries and territories. Latin Greek Cyrillic. Website europa. Main article: History of the European Union. See also: History of Europe. Main article: Ideas of European unity before Area possibly settled up to c. Area settled up to BCE. Play media. Main article: Treaties of the European Union. Main article: Future enlargement of the European Union. Main article: Demographics of the European Union. See also: List of cities in the European Union by population within city limits and list of urban areas in the European Union.
Main article: Languages of the European Union. See also: Euro English. Main article: Religion in the European Union. Main article: Member state of the European Union. Main article: Geography of the European Union. Main article: Budget of the European Union. Main articles: Area of freedom, security and justice and Citizenship of the European Union. Eurojust Headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands. Main article: Common Security and Defence Policy. Main article: European Single Market. Clockwise from top left: A standardised passport design, displaying the name of the member state, the national arms and the words "European Union" given in their official language s.
Right: 19 of the 28 EU member states have adopted the euro as their legal tender. The Eurozone dark blue represents million people. The euro is the second-largest reserve currency in the world and the world's 2nd-most-traded currency. Main article: Energy policy of the European Union. Main article: Common Agricultural Policy. Further information: Healthcare in Europe. Main article: Sport policies of the European Union.
However, only three of them — English, French and German — have the higher status of procedural languages and are used in the day-to-day workings of the European institutions. Baltic: Latvian and Lithuanian. For more information see Special member state territories and the European Union. See also: Factortame litigation : Factortame Ltd.
Secretary of State for Transport No. This is a political and not a legal requirement for membership. Amministrazione delle Finanze  ECR Danish Finance Ministry. Archived from the original on 3 May Retrieved 26 December Retrieved 3 August Those two Treaties shall have the same legal value. The Union shall replace and succeed the European Community ". European Commission. Retrieved 18 July International Monetary Fund. Retrieved 22 December Retrieved 17 April Eurostat Data Explorer.
Retrieved 12 February The United Nations. Retrieved 19 March Europa web portal. Archived from the original on 1 October Retrieved 27 September Retrieved 29 June Europa Glossary. Archived from the original on 16 January Retrieved 6 September The Council of the European Union. Retrieved 3 June Archived from the original on 10 August Retrieved 8 September Vienna Institute of Demography. BBC News. The European Superpower. Retrieved 22 November Revue des Sciences Religieuses in French. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. The Guardian. Retrieved 11 March Walter de Gruyter.
Georgetown University Press. The Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity. Attempts to increase democratic participation in local decision-making have not met with uniform success, not least because of resistance from politicians p. Still, many of the most encouraging examples of new deliberative processes working to democratize the existing political order operate at very local levels, in local schools or police stations Fung Meshing policy advice and policy decision with deliberation is therefore easier in some nations, and at some levels of government, than others.
It also seems easier at some historical moments than others: thus time matters. Until about a quarter of a century ago, for example, policy-making in Britain was highly consensual, based on extensive deliberation about policy options, albeit usually with a relatively narrow range of privileged interests. Indeed, the very necessity of creating accommodation was held to be a source of weakness in the policy process Dyson ; Dyson and Wilks Since then the system has shifted drastically away from a deliberative, accommodative mode.
Many of the characteristic mechanisms associated with consultation and argument—such as Royal Commissions—are neglected; policy is made through tiny, often informally organized cliques in the core executive. The shift is partly explicable by the great sense of crisis which engulfed British policy-makers at the end of the s, and by the conviction that crisis demanded decisive action free of the encumbrances of debates with special interests. The notion that crisis demands decision, not debate, recurs in many different times and places. Yet here is the paradox of crisis: Critical moments are precisely those when the need is greatest to learn how to make better decisions; yet the construction of crisis as a moment when speed of decision is of the essence precisely makes it the moment when those advocating persuasion and reflexivity are likely to be turned away from the policy table.
All is not gloom even here, however. The analysis of crises—exactly, particular critical events—can be a powerful aid to institutional learning March, Sproul, and Tamuz But policy activists face the same suite of choices. Policies are debated, and indeed made, in many different fora. Each operates according to a different set of rules, with a different agenda and on different timelines; each responds to different sets of pressures and urgencies; each has its own norms, language, and professional ethos.
So when you cannot get satisfaction in one place, the best advice for a policy activist is to go knocking on some other door Keck and Sikkink ; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink Yet as we show in our next section, there is overwhelming evidence of powerful structural and institutional forces that are dragging policy-makers in a deliberative direction. These powerful forces are encompassed in accounts of networked governance. Policy-making in the modern state commonly exhibits a contradictory character. Yet powerful forces are pushing systems increasingly in more decentralized and persuasion-based directions.
Complex organizations can never be run by coercion alone Etzioni An effective authority structure, just as an effective legal system, presupposes that the people operating within it themselves internalize the rules it lays down and critically evaluate their own conduct according to its precepts Hart Thus there have always been limits to command.
Some actors are more central, others more peripheral, in those networks. But even those actors at the central nodes of networks are not in a position to dictate to the others. Broad cooperation from a great many effectively independent actors is required in order for any of them to accomplish their goals. To some extent, that has always been the deeper reality underlying constitutional fictions suggesting otherwise. Nonetheless, firm albeit informal constitutional conventions mean there are myriad things that she simply may not do and retain any serious expectation of retaining her royal prerogatives unlike, apparently, her representative in other parts of her realm Marshall Formally, Britain was long a unitary state and local governments were utterly creatures of the central state; but even in the days of parliamentary triumphalism the political realities were such that the center had to bargain with local governments rather than simply dictate to them, even on purely financial matters Rhodes But increasingly such realities are looming larger and the fictions even smaller.
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If an organization acquires a certain stability and settles down to a tradition of work, one implication is usually that on the whole the same state officials come together at regular intervals. If in addition it becomes repeatedly utilized for reaching inter-governmental agreements in a given field, it may acquire a certain institutional weight and a momentum. Certain substitutes for real political sanctions can then gradually be built up. They are all informal and frail. Not upholding an agreement is something like a breach of etiquette in a club. Within these networks, none is in command.
Bringing others along, preserving the relationship, is all. If this is bad news for titular heads of notionally policy-making organizations, it is good news for the otherwise disenfranchised. The history of recent successes in protecting human rights internationally is a case in point.
Advocacy coalitions are assembled, linking groups of powerless Nigerians whose rights are being abused by the Nigerian government with groups of human rights activists abroad, who bring pressure to bear on their home governments to bring pressure to bear in turn on Nigeria Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink ; Keck and Sikkink The change has invaded areas hitherto thought of as the heartland of hierarchy and of authoritative decision by the rich and powerful.
And in the world of globally organized business, Braithwaite and Drahos paint a picture of a decentered world, where networks of bewildering complexity produce regulation often without the formality of any precise moment of decision. High modernist models of policy-making were, first and foremost, models of central control.
On those models, policy-makers were supposed to decide what should be done to promote the public good, and then to make it happen. This ambition became increasingly implausible as problems to which policy was addressed became or came to be recognized as increasingly complex.
Despite the aspiration of constantly improving social conditions, producing generally good outcomes for people without fail, a sense emerged that society is now characterized by increasingly pervasive risks, both individually and collectively Beck Even when policy-makers thought they had a firm grip on the levers of power at the center, however, they long feared that they had much less of a grip on those responsible for implementing their policies on the ground.
Substantial de facto discretion inevitably follows, however tightly rule bound their actions are formally supposed to be. But it is not just bureaucrats literally on the streets who enjoy such discretion. It can never be taken for granted that policies will be implemented on the ground as intended: Usually they will not Pressman and Wildavsky ; Bardach ; The thought was that, if you structure the incentives correctly, people will thereby have a reason for doing what you want them to do, without further intrusive intervention from public officials in the day-to-day management of their affairs.
Twin thoughts motivate this development. The first is that, by divesting itself of responsibility for front-line service delivery, the policy units of government will be in a better position to focus on strategic policy choice Osborne and Gaebler ; Gore This is hardly the first time such a thing has happened. Fix the incentives as the prince tried, the nobles always seemed to be able to figure out some way of diddling the crown Levi On the one hand, powerful, well-documented forces are pushing policy systems in the direction of deliberation, consultation, and accommodation.
And high modernism has also helped create smart people who cannot simply be ordered around: Rising levels of formal education, notably sharp rises in participation in higher education, have created large social groups with the inclination, and the intellectual resources, to demand a say in policy-making. These are some of the social developments that lie behind the spread of loosely networked advocacy coalitions of the kind noted above. Modern steering may therefore be conceived as demanding a more democratic mode of statecraft—one where the practice of the persuasive vocation of policy studies is peculiarly important.
This helps explain much of the fixation of the new public management on monitoring and control. For all the borrowing that new public management, with its privatization and outsourcing, has done from economics, the one bit of economics it seems steadfastly to ignore is the one bit that ought presumably to have most relevance to the state as an organized enterprise: the economic theory of the firm Simon Two key works emphasize the point.
You want to internalize production within the firm if, but only if, you have more confidence in your capacity to monitor and control the quality of the inputs into the production process than you do the quality of the outputs the components you would alternatively have to buy on the open market. You produce in-house only when you are relatively unconfident of your capacity to monitor the quality of the goods that external producers supply to you. One implication of this analysis for contracting out of public services to private organizations is plain: For the same reason that a private organization is formed to provide the service, the public should be hesitant to contract to them.
For the same reason the private organization does not buy in the outputs it promises to supply, preferring to produce them in-house, so too should the public organization: Contracts are inevitably incomplete, performance standards underspecified, and the room for maximizing private profits at the cost of the public purposes too great. There then follows another obvious implication: If we do contract out public services, it is better to contract them out to nonprofit suppliers who are known to share the goals that the public had in establishing the program than it is to contract them out to for-profit suppliers whose interests clearly diverge from the public purposes Smith and Lipsky ; Rose-Ackerman ; Goodin If we could, we would subcontract the services; but not knowing exactly what we want, we cannot write the relevant performance contract.
Indeed as North points out, there are even elements of the relational in the master—slave relationship , But the basic point, once again, is that we cannot specify in advance what is wanted; and insofar as we cannot, that makes a powerful case for producing in-house rather than contracting out. And that is as true for public organizations as for private, and once again equally for public organizations contracting with private organizations.
For the same reasons that the private contractors employ people at all, for those very same reasons the state ought not subcontract to those private suppliers. But in truth privatization, outsourcing, and the like actually requires more regulation, not less Majone ; Moran At a minimum, it requires detailed specification of the terms of the contract and careful monitoring of contract compliance.
Thus, we should not be surprised that the sheer number of regulations emanating from privatized polities is an order of magnitude larger Levi-Faur ; Moran The paradoxes of privatization and regulation thus just bring us back to the beginning of the growth of government in the nineteenth century. That came as a pragmatic response to practical circumstances, if anything against the ideological current of the day.
No political forces were pressing for an expansion of government, particularly. It was just a matter of one disaster after another making obvious the need, across a range of sectors, for tighter public regulation and an inspectorate to enforce it MacDonagh ; ; Atiyah Over the course of the next century, some of those sectors were taken into public hands, only then to be reprivatized. It should come as no surprise, however, that the same sort of regulatory control should be needed over those activities, once reprivatized, as proved necessary before they had been nationalized.
That and cognate aspirations toward taut control from the center combine to constitute a central trope of political high modernism. One aspect of that is the aspiration, or rather illusion, of total central control. All the great management tools of the last century were marshaled in support of that project: linear programming, operations research, cost—benefit analysis, management-by-objectives, case-controlled random experiments, and so on Rivlin ; Self ; Stokey and Zeckhauser One non-negligible problem with models of central control is that there is never any single, stable central authority that can be in complete control.
For would-be totalitarians that is a sad fact; for democratic pluralists it is something to celebrate. A Congressional Budget Office will always spring up to challenge the monolithic power of an Executive Branch General Accounting Office, just as double sets of books will always be kept in all the line departments of the most tightly planned economy. In any case, total central control is always a fraud or a fiction. One solution is of course to abandon central planning altogether and marke-tize everything Self But as we have seen above, even the more moderate ambitions of privatization and creating managed markets in the established capitalist democracies, led to anything but a more decentralized world: They created their own powerful incentives to monitor and control.
More modestly, there are new modes of more decentralized planning and control that are more sensitive to those realities. Instead of tightly specifying exact performance requirements in ways that are bound to leave some things unspecified , the laws and regulations can be written in more general and vaguely aspirational terms Goodin , 59— An interesting variation on these themes is the Open Method of Coordination practiced within the European Union. That is the illusion that policymakers begin with a full set of ends values, goals that are to be pursued, full information about the means available for pursuing them, and full information about the constraints material, social, and political resources available for pursuing them.
Its failure in the other two domains is perhaps more so. Policy-makers can never be sure exactly what resources are, or will be, available for pursuing any set of aims. So do policy-makers worldwide. In the literal sense of financial budgets, they often do not know how much they have to spend or how much they are actually committing themselves to spending. In a more diffuse sense of social support, policy-makers again often do not know how much they have or need for any given policy.
Sometimes they manage to garner more support for programs once under way than could ever have been imagined, initially; and conversely, programs that began with vast public support sometimes lose it precipitously and unpredictably. Policy-makers also often do not have a clear sense of the full range of instruments available to them.
Policies are intentions, the product of creative human imagination. But creative though they may be, policy-makers will always inevitably fail the high modernist ambition to some greater or lesser degree because of their inevitably limited knowledge of all the possible means by which goals might be pursued in policy. Much is inevitably part of the taken-for-granted background in all intentional action.
It might never occur to us to specify that we value some outcome that we always enjoyed until some new policy intervention suddenly threatens it: wilderness and species diversity, or the climate, or stable families, or whatever. We often do not know what we want until we see what we get, not because our preferences are irrationally adaptive or perhaps counter-adaptive but merely because our capacities to imagine and catalogue all good things are themselves strictly limited March The limits to instrumental rationality strengthen the case made in this chapter for policy studies as a persuasive vocation, for they strengthen the case that policy is best made, and developed, as a kind of journey of self-discovery, in which we have experientially to learn what we actually want.
And what we learn to want is in part a product of what we already have and know—which is to say, is in part a product of what policy has been hitherto. That setting is also in part a product of what has gone before. In other words, policy legacies are a key factor in policy choice—and to these we now turn. Nor is it simply a matter of issues cycling in and out of fashion, with the costs of solving some problem becoming more visible than the benefits Downs ; Hirschman It can also be true in more positive senses.
As we experiment with some policy interventions, we get new ideas of better ways to pursue old goals and a clearer view of what new goals we collectively also value. From an organizational point of view, solving problems can be as problematic as not solving them. The March of Dimes had to redefine its mission or close up shop, after its original goal—conquering polio—had been achieved.
Policy is its own cause in cases of successes as well as failures: In both cases, some new policy has to be found, and found fast, if the organization is to endure. Policy successes can cause problems in a substantive rather than merely organizational sense. Longevity, increasing disability-free life-years, is a central goal of health policy and one of the great accomplishments of the modern era. Policy can be its own cause both directly as well as indirectly. A policy might successfully change the social world in precisely the ways intended, and then those changes might themselves either prevent or enable certain further policy developments along similar lines.
Sometimes path dependency works to the advantage of policy-makers: Once village post offices are set up to deliver the Royal Mail across the realm, the same infrastructure is suddenly available also to pay all sorts of social benefits pensions, family allowances, and such like over the counter through them; there, the latter policy is easier to implement because of the first Pierson Sometimes path dependency works the other way, making subsequent policy developments harder.
An example of that is the way in which pensions being paid to Civil War veterans undercut the potential political constituency for universal old-age pensions in the USA for fully a generation or two after the rest of the developed world had adopted them Skocpol Policy is its own cause due to such path dependencies, as well. Policy-making is always a matter of choice under constraint. But not all the constraints are material. Some are social and political, having to do with the willingness of people to do what your policy asks of them or with the willingness of electors to endorse the policies that would-be policy-makers espouse.
Another large source of constraints on policy-making, however, is ideational. Technology is at its most fundamental a set of ideas for how to use a set of resources to achieve certain desired outcomes. Occasionally new policy ideas originate with creative policy analysts. Take two examples from the realm of criminology. Cracking down on petty misdemeanors might reduce crime by sending the opposite signal Wilson and Kelling Sometimes these are borrowed from other jurisdictions.
In times gone by—the times of mimeographed legislative proposals being dropped into the legislative hopper—policy borrowing could be traced by tracking the typographical errors in legislative proposals in one jurisdiction being replicated in the next Walker In other cases, the borrowing is from casebooks and classrooms of Public Policy Schools, or under pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund Stiglitz Policy choice is there characterized as the confluence of three streams: problems looking for solutions; solutions looking for problems; and people looking for things to do.
The first stream, but only that one, lines up with the hyper-rationalism of political high modernism. The latter stream represents the desperation of post-polio March of Dimers and the post-cold war Garrison State, looking for things to do once their original missions had been accomplished. The middle stream—solutions looking for problems—captures the paucity of policy ideas that serves as a major constraint on high modernist policy-making.
High modernist policy-making is supposed to be a matter of instrumentally rationally fitting means to ends. But often the means come first, and they get applied inevitably imperfectly to whatever end comes along which they might remotely fit. Take the case of the cruise missile. That technology originally developed as an p. So the original plan was shelved. But the idea was kept on the shelf; and several years later, in a window of strategic opportunity opened up by the SALT I agreements, the cruise missile was suddenly resurrected, this time as a ground-based missile system installed on the edge of the Evil Empire Levine The largest constraint under which public policy operates, of course, is the sheer selfishness of entrenched interests possessed of sufficient power to promote those interests in the most indefensible of ways.
Neither would anyone conversant with the early history of the British National Health Service and the deeply cynical maneuvering of physicians to avoid becoming employees of the state Marmor and Thomas ; Klein Moralists hope for more, as do conscientious policy analysts. Even those most political of constraints might be of indeterminate strength, though. Professional medicine, especially in the USA, is a powerfully organized interest Marmor Ordinarily we expect its practitioners to be able to see off any challengers with ease.
Certainly they successfully froze chiropractors out, when they tried to horn in on p. It may just be a case of the political power of the insurance industry, weary of ever-escalating medical costs, having been mobilized against the political power of physicians, with practitioners of alternative medicine being the incidental beneficiaries.
But, ex ante , that would have been a surprising and unexpected source of political support for the alternative medicine movement: Ex ante , one could scarcely have guessed that the power of organized medicine was as fragile as it turned out to be in this respect. These we now examine. The story of policy is in part a story about constraints. But it is also a story about change, and that is what we now examine. Policies change for all sorts of reasons. The problems change; the environments change; technologies improve; alliances alter; key staff come and go; powerful interests weigh in.
For those sadly in the know, all those are familiar facts of the policy world. But for those still inspired by democratic ideals, there is at least sometimes another side to the story: Policies can sometimes change because the people subject to those policies want them to change. There is a mass mobilization of groups pressing for reform—workers pressing for legislation on hours and wages, racial or religious minorities pressing for civil rights, women pressing for gender equity.
What is more, there is powerful comparative evidence that social and cultural developments are promoting the spread of these mass groups Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow Advocacy groups are always an important force, even in routine policy-making Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith And they are becoming more so, in networked transnational society Keck and Sikkink ; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink Social movements are advocacy coalitions writ large.
They bring pressure to bear where politically it matters, in terms of democratic theory: on elected officials. Sometimes the pressure succeeds, and Voting Rights Acts are legislated. Other times it fails, and the Equal Rights Amendment gets past Congress but is stymied by political countermobilization in state houses Mansbridge There is always an element of that, in any social movement. Even social movements ostensibly organized around specific legal texts—the proposed Great Charter or Equal Rights Amendment—were always about much more than merely enacting those texts into law.
Still, for social movements to have any impact on policy, they have to have some relatively specific policy implications. A full discussion of social movements would take us deep into the territory covered by other Handbooks in the series. But there are some things to be said about them, purely from a policy perspective. Consider the question of why social movements seem eventually to run out of steam. Many of the reasons are rooted in their political sociology: They lose touch with their grassroots; they get outmaneuvered in the centers of power; and so on Tarrow Winning the sympathies of legislators and their constituents counts for naught, if movements cannot follow up with some specific draft bill to drop into the legislative hopper.
That was at least part of the story behind the waning of the civil rights and feminist movements in the USA as sources of demand for legislative or administrative change. At some point there was a general sense, among policy-makers and mass publics, that there was simply not much more that could be done through legislation and public administration to fix the undeniable problems of racial and sexual injustice that remained.
It first mobilized around the issue of coal mine safety. That was a problem that had been widely discussed both in technical professional journals and in the wider public for some time; everyone had a pretty clear understanding of the nature of the problems and of what might constitute possible solutions. Having successfully enacted coal mine safety legislation, the safety coalition—like any good denizen of the p.
Auto safety emerged. Still, auto safety legislation was enacted. What to do next? A law was passed, but it was a law with little general backing that in effect discredited the safety coalition and inhibited it from playing any serious role in public policy discussions for more than a decade to come. It revived, in a different guise, only after the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor. Policy gets made in response to problems. But what is perceived as puzzling or problematic is not predetermined or fixed for all time. But in a way this twentieth-century morality play was just a reenactment of the earlier processes by which seventeenth-century poor laws emerged as a solution to the public nuisance of vagrancy, only to be shifted over subsequent centuries to punitive regimes of workhouses in hopes of forcing the undeserving poor to take more responsibility for their own lives Blaug Policy is sometimes simply overtaken by events.
Whole swathes of policy regulating obsolete technologies become redundant with technological advances. Policy disputes are often resolved by reframing. Policy disputes are as often resolved by some telling new fact. Issues cease being issues for all sorts of reasons: some good, some bad. Making public policy can often be a mistake.
But making an issue of child abuse and neglect was almost certainly not a mistake Nelson The difference between those cases is that in the former there was a real risk of countermobilization undoing any good done by making de facto policies more public, whereas in the latter there seems little risk of countermobilization by or even on behalf of child abusers. We have argued that the grounds for this persuasive conception are formidable.
They include the limits of instrumental rationality; the importance of deliberation in policy formation; the overwhelming evidence of the way modern governing conditions demand a style of policy-making that maximizes consultation and voluntary coordination. But the pursuit of this persuasive vocation is a hard road to follow. And the persuasive vocation must be practiced in a hostile world. There is hostility from pressed decision-makers who feel impelled to make rapid decisions in the face of urgency or even crisis; hostility from the still powerful administrative doctrines associated with the high modernist project; and hostility from entrenched powers and interests threatened by more reflective and inclusive modes of decision.
Intellectually anachronistic doctrines continue to flourish in the world of policy practice for a whole range of p. Within bureaucracies and in the vastly rewarding consulting industries that have grown up around the New Public Management there is a huge investment—intellectual and financial—in the modernistic drive for measurement and hierarchical control Power Individual crazes still sweep across policy worlds because they offer possibilities of evading democratic control: The enthusiasm for evidence-based policy-making in arenas like health care is a case in point Harrison, Moran, and Wood And in the promotion of one key variant of high modernism—globalization—key global management institutions like the World Bank and the IMF continue to promote standardized reform packages Rodrik ; Stiglitz ; Cammack So, in the end, the persuasive appeal comes back to power and interests.
Which is to say, politics. Just as the founders of the policy sciences told us from the start. Policy analysts use the imperfect tools of their trade not only to assist legitimately elected officials in implementing their democratic mandates but also to empower some groups rather than others. Furthermore, policy is never permanent, made once and for all time. Puzzles get transformed into actionable problems, and policies get made on that basis.
But that gives rise to further puzzlement, and the quest for ways of acting on those new problems. The persuasive task of policy-making and analysis alike lodges in these dynamics of deciding which puzzle to solve, what counts as a solution, and whose interests to serve. Aaron, H. Setting National Priorities. Find this resource:. Ackerman, B. Deliberation Day. New Haven, Conn. Allison, G. The Essence of Decision , 2nd edn. Reading, Mass. Anton, T. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff. Arrow, K. The economic implications of learning by doing.
Review of Economic Studies , — General Competitive Analysis. San Francisco: Holden-Day. Code of Ethics. Atiyah, P. The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Atkinson, A. The case for a participation income. Political Quarterly , 67— Atkinson, T. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bardach, E. Cambridge, Mass. On desiging implementable programs. Beck, U. The Risk Society , trans. London: Sage. Bentham, J. Panopticon: or, the Inspection-House: Containing the idea of a new principle of construction applicable to penitentiary-houses, prisons, houses of industry, work-houses, poor-houses, manufactories, mad-houses, hospitals, and schools; with a plan of management adapted to the principle.
Edinburgh: William Tait, Berry, J. Lobbying for the People. Betts, R. Analysis, war and decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable. World Politics , 61— Blau, P. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy , 2nd edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Blaug, M. The myth of the old poor law and the making of the new. Much, then, depended on the compliance the British could purchase from their subjects by way of deals and favours. But while collaborators were not hard to ind, the government in some cases was unsure about the value of their support. And similar concerns were held about the princes.
During the latter nineteenth century the Raj was compelled to intervene repeatedly in the states to repair social infrastructure damaged by gross misrule; in some cases the responsible rulers had to be deposed as a preliminary to reform. These crises of rulership did little to enhance the reputations either of the princely order or of their feudal overlords. Older studies of British rule in India were premised on the assumption that the things the British said they intended to do, actually happened.
The truth is otherwise. Moreover, the nature of the imperial compact mitigated against radical change. At the macro-level, the British found their freedom of action with regard to India and its people increasingly curtailed by the need to appease their influential supporters. Acknowledging this, the Raj after the Mutiny put the brakes on radical social reform. Similarly, at the micro-level, administrative innovation was frustrated by the undertakings entered into by venal subordinate officials with their shadowy paymasters, and by the peasantry's inbred and to some extent justiied suspicion of the motives of prying government servants [Doc.
The British were the masters of India; but they were also its servants, bonded to the subcontinent by the iron discipline of duty. They were in a sense the captives of the people they ruled. One of them concerns a time when he was called upon to shoot a rogue elephant that was destroying the crops of a village. He did not want to shoot the beast; at the last he wanted nothing more than to walk away.
But inertia, fear of ridicule, and something that might just have been the call of duty held him fast. Slowly, mechanically, he raised his rile and took aim. In 1 85 7 a loose coalition of mutinous sepoys native soldiers , rural magnates, dispossessed rulers and Muslim religious leaders had briefly threatened the tenure of the Raj in north India. Throughout the 1 s and 1 s, the imperial peace was disturbed by a series of peasant insurrections in Bengal, Bihar, Punjab and the Bombay Deccan. But by the mid- 1 s the dust was starting to settle.
There had been no further mutinies. Nor was there, as yet, any indication of widespread dissent among the civilian population of the cities. The professional classes still j ockeyed for places in the public service; businessmen still competed for government contracts; intellectuals still took nourishment from the corpus of Western learning. As for politics, the few avowedly political organisations then in existence were all thoroughly gentlemanly bodies - gentlemanly in the sense both of gender and style.
They met only occasionally, and their criticisms of government policy were respectful and polite; they had no agenda of agitation. Even the strongest of them, the Indian National Congress, seemed to the government so feeble and moribund that Curzon could condescendingly but in all seriousness announce in 1 that his ambition was to 'assist it to a peaceful demise' [ 1 9 p. We have already noted Keshub Chandra Sen's royal eulogy of 1 But the British did not need public tributes from the famous to know that the vast maj ority of the townsfolk were steadfastly loyal.
They saw evidence of it at every turn, not least in the behaviour of their servants. And the same trope crops up regularly in contemporary English fiction : as, for example, in Flora Annie Steel's story of a native 'bearer' who secretly offers sacrifices to the goddess Kali in a futile effort to save the life of the young sahib in his charge. From a modern viewpoint this behaviour reeks more of sycophancy than of real loyalty; but that is not how it was seen at the time.
But the countryside was no longer the cauldron of unrest it had been in 1 85 7. Capitalist production for the market was taking hold, and in its wake, a new class of rich peasants was emerging - farmers who owned their land, employed hired labour to work it, and marketed the surplus produce. In the 1 s these peasants had sown cotton. Afterwards they had turned to j ute and groundnuts, but particularly wheat. By the 1 s, officials were excitedly forecasting a 'wheat boom' in the Narbada valley of central India; and similar up-beat reports were coming in from the Punjab and Gujarat.
Peasants with land and crops to sell were suddenly starting to make big money, and signs of new wealth were everywhere to be seen. Meanwhile, the situation of those further down the rural hierarchy was ameliorated by the establishment of credit cooperatives and by the passage, between 1 and 1 88 5 , of a series of acts giving legal security of tenure to farmers who could prove twelve years' continous occupancy of the same plot. Periodically, even during 'boom' years, large areas and millions of lives were devastated by famine. Nor would the 'golden age' of the rich peasant last much beyond the turn of the century.
Fortuitously for the British, however, the plight of the rural underclass did not, at least in the late nineteenth century, translate into anger against the government. Victims blamed nature, or their landlords. The rural masses may not have been, as the British surmised, contented, but for a quarter of a century they remained quiescent.
From the Raj 's perspective, that was the key thing. When in 1 the dam inally did break, with an outbreak of riots over irrigation fees in the Punjab canal colonies, the shock of the event was all the greater for being wholly unexpected. As recipients of a classical education, the British ruling class knew all about the decline of Greece and the fall of Rome. But they failed to apply the obvious analogy to their own imperial follies. They thought the British Empire was different, better. They believed it would prove more durable. The empire in India, especially, seemed to them to be strong enough to last forever.
Many, perhaps most, Britons presumed that it would. Writing to the secretary of state in 1 9 1 2 , the viceroy Lord Hardinge opined: 'there can be no question as to the permanency of British rule in India' [38 p. Even as late as 1 92 3 , by which time the situation had changed dramatically, the government's planning included an assumption that the Indian Army would continue to be largely British-oficered until well into the 1 s. The mindset relected here is one that goes beyond mere arrogance. It is one of total self-assurance, a self-assurance grounded not just in an unshakeable conviction that the Raj could survive any challenge, but in the belief that it was the racial destiny of white men to rule the world [ 46].
Specifically, they had commitments to their political allies, the princes and the landed aristocracy. Not only were these groups ultimately reliant for their continued privileged existence upon British military and financial support, but in the case of the princes at least the British had clear contractual obligations, enshrined in solemn treaties, to supply military assistance if such was required to keep them on their thrones.
The 1 treaty with Hyderabad actually stipulated how many British battalions and pieces of artillery the nizam had the right to call upon in times of need. These legal ties would seriously complicate Britain's exit from India in the 1 s. More generally, the British felt a moral, but no less binding, obligation to the 'minorities' , such as the Muslims, and to the vulnerable, voiceless multitudes in the villages. As a parliamentary report put it: 'There must be an authority in India, armed with adequate powers, able to hold the scales evenly betwee11 conlicting interests and to protect those who have neither the inluence nor the ability to protect themselves' [2 p.
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Finally, and more abstractly, they felt they owed it to the Indian people to try to complete their mission civilisatrice. To glazed Victorian eyes, the Indian elites consisted of either warriors the 'martial races' or pen-pushers. The former, such as the Raj puts, the ]at-Sikhs and the Pathans, were considered virile but slow-witted; the latter, such as the Kayasthas and Vaidyas of Bengal, and the Chitpavan Brahmins of Maharashtra, were categorised as sly, cowardly and effeminate, 'moral if not physical degenerates' [26 p.
All this, however, begs an obvious question. If the British in the late nineteenth century were so wedded to the task of administering India, and had the means, as they maintained, to neutralise any internal or external threat to their position there, why, just fifty years later, did they grant the country its freedom? For all the rhetoric about a civilising mission, altruism was never at the forefront of the imperial project; empires are acquired primarily for reasons of self-interest, and to serve metropolitan ends. It follows, therefore, that the maintenance of the Indian Empire was always conditional on it continuing to provide Britain with money, power and inluence.
Between the wars, its usefulness to Britain significantly declined. Moreover, empires do not come free. There was the matter of costs to be considered: the expenditure of elite manpower, overheads, political effort. So long as the subcontinent remained a hot property, London was prepared to invest heavily to keep it; once its value declined, the outlay in British lives became increasingly unsustainable. Such is the broad argument. Let me now lesh it out by reviewing the benefits to Britain of dominion in India, itemising its costs and tracing the changing balance of the equation between 1 9 1 4 and 1 93 9.
During the nineteenth century, India became the single largest overseas market for British manufactures. There were several reasons. One was the happy coincidence that Britain's biggest industrial export, cotton textiles, was a product in high demand in the bazaars of the subcontinent.
But the main one was the government's control over tariff policy. Later, when it was put back as a revenue-raising measure, the government obliged Lancashire by clapping a countervailing excise on local manufactures.
In 1 9 1 8 London agreed that the government of India could impose a tariff; in 1 a tariff board was established in Delhi which two years later abolished the hated domestic excise; by 1 93 1 India had a substantial protective tariff. In combination, these factors resulted in a drop in the British share of Indian imports between 1 9 1 3 and 1 of 62 per cent in the case of cotton piece goods, 3 5 per cent i n the case of general machinery and 1 8 per cent i n the case o f chemicals. B y the 1 s the possession o f India was n o longer vital t o the continued prosperity of British industry .
It was a similar story with the Indian Army. In the 1 s British prime minister Lord Salisbury accurately described the Indian Army as 'an English barrack in the oriental seas from which we may draw any number of troops without paying for them' [79 p. If anything, India's contribution to imperial defence in the early twentieth century was even greater.
By the early 1 s, over 70 battalions of Indian troops were on imperial guard duty in Egypt, Iraq, Palestine and sundry other trouble-spots. Faced in mid- 1 with demands from London for an additional contribution of troops to Iraq, the government of India dug their heels in, and the secretary of state was compelled to concede the political force of their objection. In 1 this convention was firmed up with the signature of an agreement limiting India's financial liability in wartime to campaigns undertaken exclusively for the forward defence of the subcontinent.
Significantly, the Home Charges, along with debt repayments, were among the budgetary items excluded under the 1 Government of India Act from the purview of the Indian legislature. Nor was the Indian Empire in the late 1 s any less prestigious than it had been fifty years earlier. Therefore, while the imperial position in South Asia in 1 was definitely not what it had been ifty years earlier, neither had it slipped so far as to make the British think of imminent withdrawal.
As late as 1 94 2 Winston Churchill made it clear that he had 'not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire' [42 p. To understand why, at the end, the imperial will to rule in respect of India collapsed so suddenly, we need to consider other factors. This brings us, initially, to the question of costs. Despite having access to an impressive armoury of new technologies - motor cars, aeroplanes, radio, the telephone, medicine for malaria - twentieth-century administrators found India a more difficult place to administer than their late nineteenth-century predecessors had done.
In the 1 s, the number of Indians who thought about political issues was rather small; nor, as we noted earlier, were they well-organised. These Westernised critics represented no threat to the government's position. Twenty years later, it was a very different scene.
The national movement was much bigger and more resolute. It no longer petitioned; it made demands. What is more, it showed itself increasingly ready to back its criticisms of the government with agitation - marches, demonstrations, boycotts especially, after 1 90 5 , o f foreign cloth and acts o f intimidation. There were even isolated attacks on officials.
Although the terrorists managed between 1 and 1 94 7 to kill or inj ure only a tiny fraction of the British and Indian administrative elite, and although the government as a matter of principle refused to be intimidated by these actions, they did exact, over time, a psychological toll - as did, indeed, the business of repressing the upswell of dissent which became, of necessity, more and more a routine feature of Indian administration.
Every large organisation has its sprinkling of pathological types, and there is no reason to think that the British Raj was any different. General Dyer, the 'hero ' of Amritsar, was perhaps one of those. Certainly his testimony to the subsequent inquiry suggests a mind warped by paranoia [Doc.
However Dyer and his ilk were untypical. The vast majority of the ICS were basically decent men with normal instincts: men who did not relish committing violence personally or, for that matter, giving the orders that set it in motion. As officially-sanctioned violence became more and more commonplace, more and more an integral part of the process of ruling India, the j ob itself grew progressively and inexorably more stressful. We know this from, among other things, the number of ICS officers who took advantage of new rules introduced in 1 to take early retirement or transfer to the Colonial Service, which looked after territories where the natives were thought to be more passive and obedient.
Twenty-two resigned in 1 and twenty-one in 1 92 4. Moreover, the growing tumult i n India seems to have discouraged many potential future administrators from applying for the Service. The downturn is almost exactly coincident with the upsurge of mass protest in the subcontinent. After 1 9 1 9 the imperial government could maintain the ICS at the requisite level only by, first, nominating Europeans to the Service and, secondly, by inducting, in increasing numbers, qualified Indians.
This was despite a substantive improvement after 1 92 4 in the conditions of elite service in India for example, by the granting of more frequent leave and the offer of heavily subsidised passages to and from India for officers' wives and children. Over the period 1 , many more Indians than Europeans were appointed to the ICS , and of the Europeans who were sent out, almost half were the result of nomination - by implication a rather second-rate bunch.
This, of course, also had important implications for the 'steel frame' of British rule in India . Macaulay conceived of a project to civilise India by implanting Western institutions there, in particular, parliamentary institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history' [6 p. Now Macaulay was not anticipating a quick fix.
Notice he says, 'in some future age '. But the successors of this reformist-minded generation were even less sanguine about the prospect of India's transformation. As we have seen, the generation of the 1 s were resigned to the virtual permanency of British rule in the subcontinent.
By the late nineteenth century there was, undeniably, the makings of a Western-educated elite of 'brown Englishmen'. How should the Raj relate to these people? Was the growth of the Western-educated class a measure of the distance India had travelled towards fitness for self-rule? The officials of the day advanced three propositions by way of answer. The irst, and perhaps most plausible, was that the educated elite constituted merely an 'ininitesimal' fraction of the population. The second was that the crop of university graduates which had so far emerged was insuficiently qualified to oversee the running of a large and complex administration.
The third, and most contentious, was that the Western-educated were not the 'real' Indians, the ones for whom British rule had been constituted. Compare this bleak assessment with the one handed down twenty years later in the Report on Indian Constitutional Reform. It reaffirmed that the ultimate purpose of British policy was to assist India towards self-government; it firmly repudiated the notion that the ' placid, pathetic contentment of the masses' should be the Raj 's prime consideration; and it very specifically acknowledged an obligation to the urban intelligentsia.
The English-educated, it opined gravely, were 'intellectually our children' [5 p. The revolt had been a near disaster; and it had taken the imperial authorities very largely by surprise. Officials had reported stray protests against government orders, but this was dismissed as the carping of the odd few. Until the revolt broke, the British had no idea of the extent of up-country disaffection with their rule. One of the lessons drawn from the revolt was that the Raj had become too remote and had lost touch with what its subjects were thinking.
Another was that the calamity might have been avoided if the disaffected had possessed another outlet besides rebellion for their grievances. These two perceptions coalesced into a plan to open up the government by inviting a small number of knowledgeable and influential non-officials to participate in its decision-making. In 1 86 1 the legislative council of the governor-general was expanded to include between six and twelve additional' nominated members, and although the legislation did not make I this mandatory, it was accepted that the maj ority of these nominees should always be Indians.
Over time this number was broadened, to sixteen in 1 89 2 and to sixty in 1 , while further places were opened up on the provincial councils of Bombay and Madras. Gradually, too, provision was made for some of the additional members to be elected - albeit on the basis of a restricted property, tax and educational franchise. In some cases, council membership converted outspoken critics into tacit supporters. But even where this did not occur, the councils performed a useful role as benign outlets for native opinion.
Meanwhile, the government found an additional reason to associate Indians with the administration: financial devolution. From the 1 s , the Raj suffered a succession of budgetary crises due, among other things, to the burgeoning cost of imperial defence. As a way of dealing with this problem, the central government from the 1 s began to devolve more of the responsibilities for policing, public works and other governmental activities on to the provincial governments in return -for giving them an assigned share of existing taxes and the discretion to develop new sources of revenue tied to the delivery of specific services.
However, the provinces remained in deficit and had to be baled out by periodic subventions from the centre. Then the Finance Department came up with a daring suggestion. Most Indian towns already possessed municipal corporations or councils; some districts had local rural boards as well. In almost all cases, these had Indian maj orities. What if these councils and boards were given extra powers to raise money for local works, and at the same time were made responsible for their expenditure to an electorate of ratepayers? Such elected officials would be frugal with the taxpayers' money because waste would lead to them being swiftly ejected from office.
More importantly still, the government would be relieved of the need to finance roads, parochial schools and other local works from imperial revenues. It would save the need to increase the income tax, an object of great odium. Last but not least, the devolution of limited powers to local governments posed little or no political risk.
The local self-government plan was put into operation by Lord Ripon in 1 88 3. The results were so pleasing from an imperial viewpoint that, by 1 9 1 8 , Montagu and Chelmsford were prepared to apply the same logic to the provincial level of government, and to recommend the handing over of some developmental portfolios to Indian ministers responsible to an elected legislature. As we have seen, the British by the late nineteenth century had become quite disenchanted with the English-educated and their pushy political agendas.
But much as they might have liked to follow Curzon's lead and ignore the nationalist movement altogether, after 1 they were compelled by its sheer size to take notice. The necessity for conciliation, therefore, was not really questioned; the nub of the problem was to decide when to move and how much to give away. Three times during the early twentieth century the imperial authorities were forced by the pressure of events to grapple with this thorny dilemma: between 1 and 1 ; between 1 9 1 6 and 1 9 1 9 ; and between 1 92 7 and 1 93 5. Anxious to do something to rescue the moderates, the viceroy, Lord Minto, though no democrat, proposed to London a scheme of reform 'framed on sufficiently liberal lines to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of all but the most advanced Indians' [69 p.
It envisaged a modest increase in the size of the councils and in the number and powers of their non-official members, but ruled out direct voting from territorial constituencies. However, the home government in London came back almost at once with a much more radical scheme of its own. The general election of 1 in Britain had returned a Liberal government and put a visionary reformer and former champion of Irish home rule , John Morley, into the Indian Ofice.
Morley was also inluenced by his friendship with and respect for the leading Congress moderate, Gopal Krishna Gokhale , who presented the secretary of state with a cogent and pragmatic argument for substantial democratic change. For three years the two sides batted the issue back and forth but eventually Morley prevailed.
Under the Councils Act of 1 the imperial legislative council was expanded to include sixty non-official members, twenty-seven of whom were to be elected from both territorial and special interest constituencies, while the provincial councils were enlarged suficiently to create non-official maj orities. As well, Morley used his discretion to appoint two Indians to his London-based panel of advisors, and urged Minto to do the same with regard to his own executive council. Henceforward, high policy-making in India would always involve at least some Indian participation.
Yet in other respects the 1 reform package owed more to the thinking of the bureaucracy than to Morley's idealism. It restricted the right to vote to the very rich and privileged; it protected vested interests by reserving seats for landholders and chambers of commerce; and it drastically compromised the democratic principle that all votes should be of equal worth by creating separate electorates specially for Muslims and fixing a lower property and educational qualification for Muslim voters.
The next imperial initiative in the matter of reform took place in the middle of the First World War and was directly consequent upon the millenarian hopes, social tensions and political shifts triggered by India's substantial material contribution to the Entente cause. By the third year of the war, 1 9 1 6, nationalism was once again snapping hard at the heels of the Raj.
A reunited Congress had lifted its demands and was now calling for an early grant of self-government within the Empire on the model of the white dominions. More worrying still, it had settled its earlier differences with the Muslims. For the time being the Raj could not count on keeping control by exploiting the country's religious animosities.
As for the moderates, the faction had become almost moribund following the death of its two best leaders, Gokhale and Pherozeshah Mehta, in 1 9 1 5. Nevertheless, faced with adversaries on so many fronts, the British felt they had no choice but to play, once again, the appeasement card. But what should this policy pronouncement say? Viceroy Chelmsford's view was that only a bold and imaginative statement, setting out where British policy in India was headed, would sufice.
After consulting his governors Meston among them , he sent a draft text to London for consideration. By August Montagu had persuaded his Cabinet colleagues to agree, not only to a firm statement of intent, but to a further liberalisation of the constitution in directions to be negotiated between himself and Chelmsford over the winter of 1 9 1 7- 1 8.
Moreover, thanks to the obstinacy of the former viceroy, and now foreign secretay, Lord Curzon, who insisted on the substitution of 'responsible government' for 'self-government' apparently unaware that the former term had a quite specific and far-reaching parliamentary application , the famous declaration of 20 August 1 9 1 7 actually went beyond what its original authors had intended.
Britain was now implicitly committed to allowing Indians to rule themselves [Doc. Three years later part of that pledge was redeemed with the passage of the Government of India Act of 1 9 1 9. In a bid to hijack the process while they were still in office, the Conservatives in 1 sent a parliamentary delegation under Sir John Simon out to India to investigate how the current arrangements were working and to advise on how they might be improved.
But before the Simon Commission could complete its report two things intervened. First, a. Labour was much more committed than the Conservatives to the nominal British goal of preparing India for self-rule within the Empire. Secondly, the Congress at the end of 1 put the government on notice that it would launch all-out civil disobedience unless India was granted internal self-government equivalent to what was then being described in imperial circles as 'dominion status' by the end of the following year. In an attempt to avert this looming showdown, the viceroy, Lord Irwin, borrowed a leaf out of Montagu's book.
He proposed to London a statement conirming that Britain's goal for India was indeed dominionhood. In the light of the watershed Balfour Declaration of 1 92 6 , this was tantamount t o a promise o f full internal self-government. Labour prime minister Ramsay MacDonald welcomed this suggestion, and in October 1 the 'Irwin Declaration' was published. In the event, the RTC opened in 1 without the initial participation of the Congress, which refused to go back on its ultimatum.
Nevertheless, despite, or perhaps because of, the absence of Congress, by 1 93 1 a broad measure of agreement had been reached as to the shape and powers of the new state. Four years later, having been fine-tuned by two more conferences and a joint select committee of parliament, this scheme received royal assent as the Government of India Act, 1 93 5.
While keeping back some powers at the centre, it gave the provinces a very large measure of responsible government, and it conferred the right to vote on some 36 million people India-wide, women as well as men, about one-sixth of the total adult population. The British liberalised their governance of India grudgingly and with grave reservations. As late as the 1 s, many senior oficials in India, such as Army Commander-in-Chief General Sir Philip Chetwode, remained entirely opposed to any political advance for fear that it would lead to chaos [Doc.
Nor did they embark on the process of devolution as a means of preparing India for self-government at least as the term was understood by the Indian nationalists. Even John Morley, progressive Liberal that he was, categorised the notion that his reforms were intended to lay the foundations for a parliamentary system in India as a 'fantastic and ludicrous dream' [57 p. When, after 1 9 1 7 , the British expanded their policy horizon to embrace 'responsible government' for India, they did so on the specific understanding that the country would remain an 'integral' part of the British Empire.
Yet there was an inexorable logic to devolution that the British could not escape. With each concession, some ground was lost. By the 1 s, the constitutional reform process, in conjunction with the steady Indianisation of the ICS, had appreciably some might say significantly weakened the Raj 's grip on the subcontinent. This limited the demands the imperial authorities could make, further reducing its value as an exploitable resource. Moreover, once started the process was well-nigh irreversible.
These rising expectations could only be met by blanket repression at best, only a temporary option or further concessions, leading to a further erosion of authority. Back when the government was still wondering about the propriety of Indians voting for municipal councils, Finance Member Sir Evelyn Baring made an astute observation: 'When once the ball of political reform is set rolling, it is apt to gather speed as it goes' [ 6 1 p.
By the 1 s, it was travelling very fast indeed. The Raj began to stumble when, towards the end of the nineteenth century, fiscal constraints and imperial responsibilities forced it to cut back on programmes and services which the middle class, especially, had come to rely on for their economic well-being. As already remarked, the mid-nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a considerable body of English-knowing, and more generally Western-educated, Indians.
In 1 88 1 some 1 50, pupils were receiving education in British India in 'English Arts' colleges or secondary schools; by 1 90 1 their number had swelled to over , During the same period, about 30 , of these college boys went on to graduate from university. To be sure, the half million or so English-educated Indians living at the turn of the century represented as the government was fond of pointing out only a miniscule fraction of society.
It was in the best interest of the British to keep this articulate and inluential group happy. Increasingly, they were unsuccessful. The root of the malaise lay in the education system itself. British India's colleges and universities had, by modern standards, collossal failure rates. Out of 2 4 , candidates who sat for the matriculation examination in 1 88 1 , just 1 1 , passed.
While most of the unsuccessful candidates probably had only themselves to blame, this did not in any way - lessen the burden of their disappointment. However, the greater problem was the increasing inability of the public service and the professions to offer employment suitable to the needs and aspirations of the Western-educated - even those among them who had graduated successfully. However, various, not entirely accidental, impediments the fact that the annual entrance examination was held in London, the requirement from the 1 s for candidates to have had two years at an English university, the lowering of the maximum age of entry during the same period from twenty-three to nineteen kept the intake of Indian civilians to a trickle until the 1 s.
In 1 there were j ust sixteen Indians in a Service over strong. Many had to make do with more poorly paid j obs lower down - or none at all. And it was the same. A few Indians in the late nineteenth century became extremely rich working as barristers in the chief Presidency courts. Badruddin Tyabji, an eminent Muslim lawyer from Bombay, earned 1 22 , rupees from his legal practice in 1 , which was four times the annual salary of an ICS officer. But most law graduates had to graft a living working as vakils pleaders in mofussil provincial towns.
In Madras, j ust lawyers most of them city lawyers were earning incomes of over 2 , rupees annually in 1 ; of the rest, some were pulling in as little as rupees a year. As early as 1 Ripon saw the menace lurking on the horizon: 'Unless we are prepared to afford these men legitimate openings for their aspirations and ambitions, we had better at once abolish our Universities and close our Colleges, for they will only serve to turn out year by year in ever-increasing numbers men who must inevitably become the most dangerous and inluential enemies of our rule ' [6 1 p.
But the British did neither, and the problem continued to grow. For every satiated professional man at the end of the nineteenth century, a dozen others harboured feelings of disappointment and frustration, feelings that a little propaganda could easily turn into anger and resentment against the government. Another source of Indian discontent was taxation. The government's tax take rose from million rupees in 1 to 50 1 million rupees in 1 , an increase of over one-third. Land taxes rose during the latter nineteenth century, but much less than agricultural prices.
Taxpayer resentment was sharpened, too, by the iscal critiques of writers such as English radical William Digby and retired Bengali divisional commissioner Romesh Chandra Dutt [Doc. By contrast, welfare and development areas public works, education, health and agricultural research together comprised less than 1 0 per cent of outlays. These stark figures were so damning in themselves, that they hardly needed any embellishment from the government's critics.